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World leaders settled into their seats at the opening ceremonies of the 2008 
Olympic Games in Beijing. All eyes were on China; the Olympics were their opportunity 
to showcase themselves as a superpower. China hoped it would be an opportunity to 
finally be treated as a responsible equal. While the world watched one rising power 
execute the logistical nightmare of the Olympics seamlessly, another power, Russia, 
began pouring tanks and shells over their southern border, creating their own nightmare 
in Georgia.  
While China was praised in August 2008, international media outlets and 
governments around the world exploded in an uproar as the Russian military swarmed 
into northern Georgia and decimated Georgian positions from the northern border to Poti. 
Russian troops stopped their columns just short of Tbilisi, the capital. Russia eventually 
withdrew to its earlier positions, but not before obliterating the Georgian military—their 
point was made. Russia didn’t seem too perturbed by the international outcry, especially 
as details later began to emerge that cast the Georgian military and their president, 
Mikhail Saakashvili, as provoking the war. 
 As winter approached, so did the specter of Gazprom’s annual contract bickering 
with Ukraine. January 1st, 2009, arrived, and the two sides didn’t reach an agreement. 
Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas giant, reached for the gas valve and shut off supplies, 
not only freezing Ukraine, but many European countries who depend on Ukraine to 
transport gas. Bulgaria, Italy and Serbia were among those hard hit. The dispute lasted 
nearly three weeks—not only were millions in transit revenues lost by Ukraine, but 
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untold damage was done to both countries already fragile reputations as Europe began 
scrambling for alternatives.  
 Some intriguing questions are: why did the Russian military invade Georgia in the 
summer of 2008, while military engagement was never an option against Ukraine? What 
accounts for the variations in treatment of similar countries? One could argue that 
Georgia’s provocation and use of force in South Ossetia opened the door for a violent 
response while Ukraine’s standoffs with Russia are of a more diplomatic and different 
nature. Georgia, however, has engaged in violent skirmishes with Ossetians and 
Abkhazians intermittently throughout its first two decades of independence. Military 
reprisals from Russia were the remotest of possible responses, with Russia usually using 
soft power and energy leverage to respond. Why did Russia invade Georgia this time, and 
not on previous occasions? 
Ukraine’s disagreements with Russia have been less than benign; in the early 
1990’s, Ukraine and Russia disputed issues such as territory on the Crimea, partition of 
the Black Sea Navy and the handling of Soviet-era nuclear weapons. These were all 
possible flashpoints for a military standoff. Why then, has military conflict seemed 
virtually inevitable between Russia and Georgia since 2007 (and ultimately realized in 
2008), whereas with Russia and Ukraine war seems all but impossible?  
Ukraine and Georgia seem similar. Each is a divided country where large 
nationalist portions want to extricate themselves from Russian influence and another 
portion seek to retain stronger ties with Russia (though admittedly the proportion of 
nationalists to pro-Russians is significantly larger in Georgia). Each seesawed between 
policies that reflected Western sympathies and policies that reflected Russian sympathies. 
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Each continues to struggle with corruption while establishing the foundations of a 
functioning democracy. Each has, at one time or another, been extremely dependent on 
Russia for energy supplies. Yet the outcomes are radically different. An extremely 
instructive point is found in how Russia uses its energy leverage over Georgia and 
Ukraine in two different ways. 
A helpful episode to explain this quandary is one of Russia’s previous energy 
rows with its neighbors. When Russia turned the gas off to Ukraine in January 2009, 
journalists and analysts immediately began comparing the dispute to January 2006, when 
Russia shut off the gas to Ukraine for three days, prompting the EU to denounce Russia’s 
use of energy as a weapon. Another contract dispute with Georgia occurred 
simultaneously and incurred far less attention. The main gas pipeline to Georgia 
mysteriously exploded, and the main electric power line to Georgia shut down entirely. 
Russia claimed that violent Chechen saboteurs blew up the pipeline amidst varying 
accusations from Georgian leadership. The story, for all the glamour of explosions and 
terrorism, was secondary to Ukraine’s gas shutoff, which sent ripples through Europe 
(and forced Italy into a temporary energy emergency). One cannot help but notice that 
gas pipeline explosions happen far more often near the Georgian and Ukrainian borders 
even as the number of such incidents is declining overall (see Figures 2 and 3). 
The simultaneous energy cutoffs to Ukraine and Georgia were indicative of 
Russia’s strategies towards the near abroad. Towards Georgia, Russia was 
straightforwardly adversarial with its energy leverage, which led Georgia to eventually 
dramatically alter its energy arrangements. Towards Ukraine, however, Russia was and 
continues to be handcuffed by commitments to Europe, leading to a much more moderate 
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approach. While the energy cutoffs with Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 represented dramatic 
conflict and the height of tensions between the neighbors, cutoffs with Georgia were the 
norm. The response to Ukraine’s 2006 shutoff showed that Russia continually treads 
much more carefully with Kiev than with Tbilisi.  
 These cleavages in strategy are extremely significant. Had Russia employed a 
more moderate approach to Georgia and not lost its upper hand in the energy sphere, they  
would have possessed another tool of leverage and potentially avoided having to use  
 
 









Figure 3. Pipeline Breaks by Location, 2000-2002. The period covered is arbitrary, but 
shows a trend of more breaks closer to Georgia. Kiev, it should be noted, is in line with 




military force in August 2008. Their less confrontational approach towards Ukraine, 
however, has sustained a Ukrainian faction advocating closer economic and political ties 
with Russia. This contributes to the quarreling in Ukraine and prevents Kiev from 
decisive action away from Russian interests and towards European ones. Greater 
bargaining power for Kiev (most Russian gas must pass through Ukraine) also increases 
the likelihood the two countries will stay involved with each other; there’s a tangible 
quid-pro-quo between Kiev and Moscow. Tbilisi has little to offer Moscow and therefore 
no bargaining power. 
 The success of using energy as a leverage in Russia presents a paradox. In one 
case, Russia had all the geopolitical advantages. In the other example, Russia continues to 
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possess advantages to work with, but contends with a country that has plenty of strategies 
at its disposal. Their use of leverage, however, was and continues to be successful in the 
Ukrainian case, whereas with the Georgia case Russia boorishly threw those advantages 
away. 
While Russia virtually guaranteed the continuing autonomy of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia and achieved a decisive military victory over Georgia, the political 
outcome is nowhere near a success. With Georgia, Russia can be seen as having failed 
immensely—by squandering all prior levers over Georgia, the Kremlin was left with no 
means of pressuring Georgia into adopting policies that benefit Russia.   
 Where Ukraine is concerned, Russia must be seen as successfully using their 
energy leverage. Russia continues to utilize its monopoly over Ukraine’s energy supply 
and penetrates Ukrainian industry by buying both majority and minority stakes in various 
Ukrainian companies. Russia’s access to the Ukrainian political sphere contributes 
immensely to the wrangling for power between the Ukrainian Presidency and the 
Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) that has hampered change and reform since the Orange 
Revolution of 2004. 
 It is of course necessary to define how the term ‘leverage’ is being used in the 
following pages. Leverage here can be manifested as both carrot and stick. Russia’s 
leverage is its vast energy supplies (whereas its neighbors are resource poor). Russia can 
then incentivize certain political decisions in neighboring countries while discouraging 
others. Leverage, for the purposes of Russia, means linking energy policy to ordinarily 
unrelated areas. Where business rationale would normally dictate decisions, political 
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considerations come into play and make energy policy far more than a matter of dollars 
and cents.  
The two cases also provide examples of two different routes that smaller, less 
powerful states take when striving for autonomy and power when a regional hegemon 
aims to restrict that autonomy, and the possible consequences. Smaller states can take 
combative stances that risk destructive conflict and divorce friendly ties between the two, 
which thereby makes autonomy and independent development easier. The other path for 
states attempting to ease away from a regional power is to be moderate and conciliatory. 
A compromising approach is much more stable but risks allowing the hegemon 
opportunities for their interests to penetrate the smaller state and retain a higher level of 
influence in the weaker state. Likewise these different routes present themselves to the 
hegemon. 
 The implications of these cases go well beyond the realm of energy politics. The 
different strategies of energy leverage have larger implications for independence, 
democracy building and transparency. Energy relations are representative of bigger 
processes and the more general relationships of newly independent countries or weak 
states whose interests are vulnerable to more powerful, undemocratic regimes. 
The differing outcomes also present a new set of criteria from which to see Post-
Soviet states. Other theories go a long way towards explaining the trajectories of post-
Soviet or former Communist bloc countries closer towards the West, such as the Baltics, 
Balkans and Central Europe.  Other theories also do a good job of explaining the 
relatively uniformity of repressive governments of Central Asia. Most theories, however, 
tend to group together those countries that fit neither category. Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, 
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Azerbaijan and Moldova are often lumped together, when in actuality their outcomes are 
extremely varied. The differing energy leverage strategies argument helps explain the 
different situations; it also may help explain differences between the Central Asian 
countries. 
 
Methodology and Evidence 
 
 To conduct an operational study of one aspect (energy) of Russian foreign policy, 
it is not sufficient to simply examine the statements of officials. I carefully examined any 
kind of energy interactions, be they highly publicized or not, and looked for their 
implication. To do so, I conducted searches on both LexisNexis and Factiva. Search 
terms were ‘Russia’, ‘Ukraine’ and ‘Energy’, when looking for Ukrainian energy 
interactions with Russia and ‘Russia’, ‘Georgia’ and ‘Energy’ when looking for Georgian 
interactions with Russia. Various other searches such as ‘Ukraine’ and ‘Pipelines’ or 
‘Georgia’ and ‘Itera’ were used to pare down results relating to specific topics. The 
results were thousands of newspaper articles used to establish trends and weave together 
a narrative of Russia’s energy interactions with each country. 
To effectively determine the interplay of energy, leverage, Russian policy and 
outcomes in near-abroad countries, I decided to use two focused case studies. Each case 
study provides a chronology of major political events and their relations to incidents of 
Russia’s use of energy as leverage. While it would be preferable to have data and an 
understanding of the use of energy as leverage across all post-Soviet republics, such an 
approach has its own shortcomings. In-depth case studies, on the other hand, allow the 
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reader a deeper understanding of the actors and tactics used. Important players such as 
third-party trading companies would not be visible and their effects nullified, though such 
companies and their effects are an important facet of the use of energy as leverage in the 
Russian near abroad. My approach allows the reader to identify more of the actors 
shaping outcomes.1  
 
Outline of the Thesis 
  
The rest of the work is as follows: a theoretical chapter that surveys the literature 
on Russian foreign policy and the pursuit of empire as a motivation. This chapter 
attempts to depict different currents of thought on Russian foreign policy, discussing their 
strengths in explaining motivations and their weaknesses in explaining outcomes. It also 
examines some of the literature on Russian use of energy. I then argue that the 
examination of variations across Russian use of energy as leverage is necessary for 
understanding different outcomes. 
 Following the theoretical chapter are two case studies. The first case examined is 
Georgia, where a confrontational approach led to Russia’s loss of energy as leverage and 
eventually military conflict between the two. The second case examined is Ukraine, 
where diffusion of conflict led to greater ties between Russian and Ukrainian interests 
and continued Russian influence. Following the case studies is a conclusion that 









 Russia does not treat her neighbors the same way. In large part, this has to do with 
the degree of democratic reform in the neighboring country—Russia’s relations are frosty 
and resentful with those who instituted democratic reform immediately after the fall of 
the Soviet Union and turned West, such as Eastern Europe and the Baltics, while relations 
are fraternal with those who have not reformed much, such as Central Asia and Belarus. 
This work, however, concerns a third group—those nations that are somewhere in 
between, seeking democratic reform and warmer relations with the West a whole decade 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this third group, however, there is enormous 
variation in their relations with the Kremlin. Russia and Georgia have experienced 
violent conflict, yet no such conflict seems likely with Ukraine, though the issues at stake 
are similar.  
Both Ukraine and Georgia have sought democratic reform and NATO 
membership around the same time period. Both have divided electorates and have had 
territorial disputes with Russia (Ukraine over the Crimea and Georgia over Ossetia and 
Abkhazia). Both countries have attempted to avoid regional groupings like the CIS, 
seeing them as purveyors of Russian domination. Neither country has significant resource 
wealth. Why do these seemingly similar cases have such different outcomes? 
 The following work will argue that the answer has a lot to do with energy. In both 
the cases examined, Georgia and Ukraine, Russia has attempted to use energy as leverage 
to dictate policy and relations. Were Russian strategies of using energy as leverage 
uniform, the outcomes would be uniform. That, however, is not the case. In the case of 
Georgia, Russia unsuccessfully used a strategy of escalation, where energy was used 
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extensively as leverage with cutoffs, raising prices and calling in debts; these uses of 
leverage increase significantly when important political decisions and moves were at 
hand in Georgia. In the case of Ukraine, however, Russia continues to successfully use a 
strategy of moderation, resorting more to forgiving energy debts, discounting prices and 
pushing for greater business integration; the frequency of these events stays constant and 
does not significantly rise around the time of important political events. These differences 
in energy tactics are important, as they appear to play a role in determining these 
dramatically different outcomes. 
 This chapter explores the theoretical debate on Russia’s pursuit of empire in the 
near abroad. Whether or not Russia continues to be an empire, the idea still holds weight; 
citizens and policymakers of both Russia and its neighboring countries are cognizant of 
the idea of Russian empire. It is essential for understanding interactions between Russia 
and the newly independent countries that surround it.  
My argument examines the reasons that similar circumstances produce different 
outcomes amongst the late reformers in Russia’s near abroad, but the underpinnings of 
both the Russian actions and their neighbor’s reactions are predicated on Russian pursuit 
of empire. This chapter will introduce the main currents of thought in the debate on 
empire, and also introduce ideas the debate seems to overlook, namely the different uses 
of energy leverage and different outcomes amongst late reformers. The debate on empire 
is important for understanding the context of Russian motivations and outcomes, but it 




Categorizing the Newly Independent States 
 
The end of the Soviet Union was a large laboratory experiment for the field of 
comparative politics. From one monolith and its not-so-far-flung satellites throughout 
Eastern and Southern Europe 27 newly independent countries were born. All of them had 
different geographic, social and economic variables to distinguish them, but they all had a 
common past and similar baggage. Each country held on tight for a period of turbulent 
transition away from Communist, one-party rule and planned, stagnant economies 
towards multiparty, democratic rule and market economies.  
 The post-Soviet countries progressed in many different directions. Some adopted 
successful market economies and solid liberal democracies. Others traded in Communist 
rule for authoritarian rule, but successfully adopted market economies. A good deal of 
countries, however, stalled somewhere in between. Democrats seesawed with hard-liners 
and authoritarians in the power balance—cabinets reshuffled, parliaments were purged 
and general uncertainty persisted.2 
 A handful of countries, mostly those of Eastern Europe, such as Hungary, 
Slovenia, Croatia, Poland and the Czech Republic lead the way in creating a norm of 
successful democracies from the non-republic former satellites. Even the Baltic States of 
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, former Soviet Socialist Republics, succeeded. Large 
amount of comparative work has focused on these successful (though by no means 
                                                        
2 Valerie Bunce gives an excellent survey of the variation of post-Soviet countries in her 1999 article “The 
Political Economy of Postsocialism” Slavic Review, Vol. 58, No. 4, Winter 1999, 756-793. The cases 
given special attention in this work, Ukraine and Georgia, have shifted considerably since the writing of 
that article, however. They represent a third group, late reformers, discussed above. 
  15 
painless) transitions to democracy. They are not, however, the norm.3 Most countries, as 
Charles King writes, are ‘laggards’ and have actually taken steps backward instead of 
forward. “Is Azerbaijan really struggling towards democracy…” he asks, “rather than 
rushing back toward authoritarianism?”4 
 The momentum of democratization and adoption of Western-friendly 
governments is not inevitable and should not be viewed as such. It is easy to adopt the 
habit of viewing the successful democratizers as leading a slow but inescapable 
procession towards democracy, while the Lukashenkas, Karimovs and Aliyevs of post-
Soviet space are the irrational and eccentric exceptions. Increasing work must be done on 
Central Asia and the Caucasus, which, as King notes, are largely ignored, but their 
experience is by and large the dominant one of the post-Soviet republics. 
Very little attention, moreover, is given to those countries that were slow to take 
drastic measures of reform or democratization. While the most successful democratizers 
and market reformers were those that adopted measures in the early 1990’s, there are 
plenty of cases of countries that experienced little reform or democratization in the 
1990’s but launched these processes after the year 2000. The Rose, Orange, Velvet and 
Bulldozer revolutions are the clearest examples. Their path, however, has been much less 
distinct than that of the earlier democratizers. The late democratizers are stuck in between 
the traditional groupings. They have gotten little attention as their own group—late 
reformers, whose obstacles and chances for success are emerging as distinct from the 
reformers of the 1990’s and the retrenchers. This study focuses on this group, examining 
two cases: Ukraine and Georgia. Scholars such as Sakwa argued that Ukraine had 
                                                        
3 King, Charles, Post-Postcommunism: Transition, Comparison and the End of ‘Eastern Europe’, World 
Politics, Vol. 53, No. 1, October 2000 
4 Ibid (152) 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become part of Eastern Europe in the late 1990s.5 Since then, however, Eastern Europe 
made considerable strides while Ukraine stalled and fell back into this gray area. 
 One of the deciding factors behind the trajectories of these late reforming 
countries is their interaction with Russia. As the regional hegemonic power, newly 
independent nations cannot help but heed policies and behavior radiating from the 
Kremlin. Absolute disregard or challenging of Russian interests can lead to economic 
sanctions, or in the cases of Moldova and Georgia, military intervention. Thus, to 
understand the behavior of states in the post-Soviet space, it is essential to try and 
understand the effect of Russian foreign policy on the near abroad. For states like 
Ukraine and Georgia, their trajectories are shaped by Russian politics and policy. 
 There is no shortage of explanations and descriptions of Russian foreign policy 
towards their neighbors. The debate encompasses a wide array of theories regarding 
Russian attitudes, intentions and overall success. Ultimately, however, all theories in 
some form or another attribute Russian foreign policy behavior to a key idea influencing 
and directing policy towards the near abroad: great power status and empire. Whether 
seeing Russian imperial aspirations as malevolent, benign or somewhere in between, the 
debate on Russian foreign policy is in consensus that the Kremlin is trying to refresh its 
influence in the near abroad. In short, scholars and policymakers alike agree that 
Moscow’s influence on its neighbors waned at the end of the Soviet Union, but Yeltsin 








The definition of empire is important; it may not explain why outcomes occur as 
they do, but it points us towards an explanation of the motivations behind Russian foreign 
policy. I will use a definition in line with Robert Gilpin’s description of mercantilism, 
which states that politics directs economics, or that financial power is used to achieve 
political goals. Russia’s political goal is influencing events in the region. The Russian 
motivation is not one of building stability or harmonious relations, but keeping their 
influence intact. The debate on Russian empire, however, fails to see this point and 
consequently fails to explain outcomes. Geopolitical viewpoints presuppose regional 
stability as a goal; as we will see, stability is not necessarily the motivation of Russian 
foreign policy; therefore we cannot expect Russia’s pursuit of empire to produce stable 
outcomes. Rather, Russian pursuit of empire may upset stability in otherwise stable 
countries. In accordance, energy is not used as a tool to promote stability, but as a tool for 
maintaining influence. The following section will explore the definitions of empire and 
their relative deficiencies connecting motivations with tumultuous outcomes. 
The term great power and empire have very different meanings, often depending 
on the scholar or policymaker using the term. According to Mark Beissinger’s cultural 
explanation, proclaiming oneself a ‘great power’ gives a form of legitimacy. A great 
power’s actions can be perceived as falling within a reasonable realm of pursuing the 
greater national interest. The term ‘Empire’, however, isn’t accompanied by legitimacy.6 
On the other hand, Michael Doyle, in his structural approach to empires, defines an 
                                                        
6 The Persisting Ambiguity of Empire, Beissinger, Mark, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 11, no. 2, 1995 149-184 
(167) 
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imperial relationship as ‘people subject to unequal rule.’7 The use of the word also has 
connotations that may not be intended by writers, especially regarding Russia and the 
Soviet Union. Dominic Lieven astutely observes, 
 
“Especially given the Marxist-Leninist simplicities in which most Russians have 
been educated, to define the Soviet Union as an empire is to condemn it outright, in the 
process dispatching much of the lives of Russia’s older generation to the rubbish bin, or 
even damning them as morally tainted. If the Soviet Union was an empire then not 
merely was it illegitimate, it was also fated to disappear in a modern world in which 
empire is taken to be redundant.”8 
 
The term empire carries with it many problems for Russia. It tenuously sits opposed to 
Soviet ideology, since empire implies capitalist encroachment and expansion.9 It also 
implies inevitable demise.10 Lieven notes, however, that the idea of empire seems to 
persist in Russia, carrying over from the Tsarist period into the Soviet period and now in 
the post-Soviet period as a relatively continuous idea, uninterrupted by the disintegration 
of the states that actually executed imperial policy.11 While the Soviet Union did indeed 
crumble, the Russian Federation is very much intact and this work does not wish to imply 
that the Russian Federation faces impending doom. Nor does this work wish to comment 
much on the moral legitimacy of Russian power. Such discussions, while important, lie 
outside the scope of this work, but it is still necessary, however, to notate them to avoid 
misunderstanding.  
 This work will not pursue the idea of empire in the same vein as Beissinger’s 
cultural or Doyle’s structural definition. It will heed their definitions and at times borrow 
                                                        
7 Doyle, Michael, Empires, Cornell University Press, 1986 (36) 
8 Lieven, Dominic, Empire, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2000 (5) 
9 Ibid (22) 
10 Ambiguous Categories: States, Empires and Nations, Suny, Ronald Grigor, Post Soviet Affairs, vol. 11, 
no. 2, 1995, 185-196 
11 Lieven, This points to Lieven’s approach wading into cultural arguments. 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from their ideas. For the purposes of this study, Russian foreign policy and use of the 
concept of empire is akin to Robert Gilpin’s description and definition of mercantilism. 
Gilpin, one of the fathers of realist theory, lays out three perspectives on political 
economy: liberalism, Marxism and mercantilism. The main actors in mercantilism, 
according to Gilpin, are nation-states, as opposed to economic classes in a Marxist 
perspective or firms and households in a liberal perspective. The major point, however, in 
relation to this work and energy politics, is what determines and guides policy. In a 
liberal perspective, economics should determine politics. In a Marxist perspective, 
economics does determine politics. With a mercantilist viewpoint, however, political 
concerns determine economics. Resources are mobilized not on the grounds of rational 
economic action, but on the grounds of maximizing the national interest.12 
 In our case studies, we will see that Russia often sells gas below market prices, 
forgives debts or undertakes expensive, economically irrational projects to further their 
political interests. Pursuing empire, as the cases show, is not motivated by goals of 
harmonious, lucrative economic relations. Nor is empire motivated by a desire to 
promulgate some sort of ideology or set of values. Empire, to Russian interests, entails 
marshaling economic resources to achieve political goals. These political goals are to 
create an atmosphere in the near abroad that is receptive and responsive to Russian 
interests and concerns. The near abroad, Russia believes, should be a malleable venue for 
Russian influence. 
 Similarly, this definition it can help us to understand what tactics and operational 
aspects are being used. If Gilpin’s description of mercantilism is applied to Russia, we 
                                                        
12 Gilpin, Robert, US Power and the Multinational Corporation, HarperCollins, 1975. In particular, these 
ideas are drawn from the chapter The Relation of Politics and Economics. 
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see that economic outcomes are not essential to Russia in their pursuit of empire. Instead 
political outcomes are of the utmost importance. In addition, it isn’t specific political 
outcomes that interest Russia, but more maintaining influence over these political 
outcomes. Energy, therefore, is not meant to promote harmonious or profitable economic 
relations or energy security to region; it is meant to propagate Russian influence. 
Some, as described below, write that Russia wants to keep a role as a guarantor of 
stability. It is more important to Russia, however, to influence events than to consolidate 
stability. Russian tactics, therefore, are intended to increase influence, not necessarily 
short-term stability. Aims such as satisfying domestic desire to see Russian hegemony in 
the near abroad and stabilizing the region do not explain Russia’s often economically 
unprofitable tactics, since economic stability and raising a standard of living would 
presumably best achieve these goals. The mercantilist approach, however, highlights the 
reasoning behind seemingly counterproductive and economically foolhardy ventures; 
they are an effort to garner influence at any cost. As we will see, there are different ways 
that Russia goes about achieving these aims. 
 Two main identifiable trends in the literature on Russian foreign policy and its 
pursuit of influence in the near abroad emerge. The first trend, fairly obvious given the 
debate’s focus on the ‘near abroad’, is the continued importance of geopolitics. The 
second trend, more complex, is the interplay of domestic attitudes, policy shortcomings 
and resulting expansionism. Gail Lapidus perhaps words it most concisely as Russia 
being ‘between assertiveness and insecurity.’13 The two trends are of course connected. 
                                                        
13 Between Assertiveness and Insecurity: Russian Elite Attitudes and the Russia-Georgia Crisis, Lapidus, 
Gail, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 23, no. 2, April-June 2007, 138-155 
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Explaining Empire in the Post-Soviet Space: Studies Addressing Empire But Not Energy 
 
Geopolitical Motivations and Explanations 
 
The first trend to be noted is the emphasis on geopolitics, the idea that geography 
should determine a countries alliances, orientation and behavior. The geopolitical school 
assumes regional stability is an aim of Russian foreign policy; the case studies that 
follow, however, indicate otherwise. Russian use of energy as leverage shows that 
stability is not always a primary goal, therefore we cannot expect the stable outcomes that 
geopolitical theorists anticipate.  
Many scholars insist Russia renewed the importance of geopolitics, and is being 
assertive in the near abroad once again. In fact Russia has never stopped pursuing 
geopolitical aims; they have simply become more powerful and more successful at it. 
According to the field in general, once Russia became developed in the post-Cold War 
world, geopolitics were fated to disappear. It was believed that developed countries do 
not pursue geopolitical aims, but rather economic ones that depend on practical, not 
spatial considerations. As Bobo Lo writes, this is not the case in Russian foreign policy, 
as geopolitics still takes center stage though it should be an ‘anachronism’.14 A country 
                                                        
14 Lo, Bobo, Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002 (98) 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with Russia’s wealth, he believes, should not be pursuing foreign policy according to 
geographic considerations but according to economic concerns in an increasingly 
globalized world. Accordingly, countries like Ukraine and Georgia, recently glancing 
westward for support, worry Russia, stuck in a geopolitical mindset. They do not want 
NATO allies on their borders, even if NATO does little to disrupt the regional economic 
order. Russia uses resources to prevent this, even if such actions are discordant with 
economic aims. Here the debate seems to effectively note aspects of the mercantilist 
approach. 
 The calculations of geopolitics have not shifted in the slightest, argues Janusz 
Bugajski. Russia withdrew from the rest of the former Soviet Union not because of an 
ideological shift, he writes, but because the ‘burden of empire had become too 
onerous.”15 Only financial difficulty caused Russia to pull out of the former Soviet 
republics, Bugajski argues, though his account is one of the more extreme of Russian 
imperial aims. If Bugajski’s account is valid, however, then a recovering economy will 
lead to Russia’s resurgence and increased activity in the near abroad. The energy 
revenues of 2003-2008 certainly provide that boost, and consequently Russia is more 
active towards Ukraine and Georgia. Bugajski’s account, however, would lead readers to 
believe that Russian foreign policy scaled back its imperial ambitions in the 1990s when 
harsh inflation plagued the country. As the reader will see below, however, Russia still 
pursued imperial policies in the 1990s, contrary to what Bugajski may suggest. Even in 
the 1990s, politics remained more important that economics. 
                                                        
15 Bugajski, Janusz, Cold Peace, Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2004(5) 
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 Russia is also viewed as a regional ‘guarantor of stability’ filling what it sees as a 
power vacuum in the near abroad. If Russia does not fill the void, Russians believe, some 
other power will.16 Even Russian official documents do not shy away from emphasizing 
geopolitics, though they avoid the word itself. Igor Ivanov, the Russian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs from 1998-2004, repeatedly stressed a negative view of NATO’s 
geographic expansion, a heavily geopolitical concern for Russia as its neighbors consider 
NATO membership.17 Ivanov also characterizes Russian priorities as “keeping the 
internal borders porous by focusing on the external security of the CIS borders,” or 
viewing the region as one geopolitical block.18 The CIS, which Deyermond later posits as 
a means of replicating Soviet models of sovereignty,19 can only be effective if the larger, 
more powerful newly-independent states take an active role in promoting it as a vital 
regional organization. Ukraine is one of these especially prominent states in the post-
Soviet space, leading Russia to urge their participation in the CIS, as we will see in the 
Ukraine case. 
 Dmitri Trenin argues that the driving issue in Russian foreign policy in the near 
abroad is borders. There is a Russian obsession with borders that seems to supersede all 
else.20 Trenin writes that Russia’s intrigue with border issues stems from age-old 
insecurities, which links to the second trend in the conversation on Russia’s pursuit of 
great power status in the near abroad. Russia dabbles in exacerbating Georgia’s own 
                                                        
16 Russia and Its Western Neighbors in the ‘Near Abroad’, Kanet, Roger and Kozhemiakin, Alexander, 
printed in The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, ed. Kanet and Kozhemiakin, St. Martin’s Press, 
New York, 1997 (31) 
17 Ivanov, Igor, The New Russian Diplomacy, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 2002 (178) 
18 Ibid (82) 
19 Deyermond, Ruth, Security and Sovereignty in the Former Soviet Union, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 2008 
20 Trenin, Dmitri, The End of Eurasia, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 
2002 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border problems with Abkhazia, Adjaria and South Ossetia, and Ukraine’s with their 
dispute over the Crimea. Russia’s interest in their own borders perhaps leads the Kremlin 
to believe that toying with the stability of their neighbor’s borders is an effective weapon. 
 These lines of argument, however, fail to explain the different outcomes of 
Georgia and Ukraine. Under the geopolitical argument, Russia should want stability in 
both countries, and therefore work to preserve the integrity of Georgia’s borders and the 
consolidation of power of Ukraine’s leadership. Rather, Russia disturbs Georgia’s 
borders and drills fissures into Ukraine’s political scene. Moreover, Bugajski’s 
geopolitical account has readers believe that Russia would stop pursuing aims of empire 
during hard times, which did not occur; Russia was simply less effective at pursuing 
these aims.  
Furthermore, if Russia were punishing countries for their aspirations to join 
NATO, why has the punishment been so much harsher on Georgia? Were Russia trying 
to entice countries like Ukraine and Georgia into joining organizations like the CIS and 
catering to Russian interests, one would think they would offer discount energy prices to 
all their neighbors, instead of employing different strategies. This argument does not 
explain the different considerations Russia makes when calculating policy, namely, the 
different energy linkages each country has with Western Europe. The line of argument 
does not explain variations across countries nor does it explain differing patterns of 






Russian Insecurity, Nationalism and Domestic Politics as Motivation 
 
The second trend picked up in the discussion on Russian foreign policy is Russian 
expansionism in response to failures at home and nationalist sentiment. Russian foreign 
policy, according to these theorists, measures domestic attitudes and makes bellicose 
moves partly as a response to these attitudes. This explanation of Russian foreign policy, 
however, similarly mishandles issues of variation. Variation is measured across time, but 
not across space. Examinations of energy leverage show little variation across time, 
whereas methods vary from place to place. Similarly, variations are explained partly on 
account of Russian leaders, such as Putin, and not the foreign leaders such as Saakashvili 
or Yuschenko. Moreover, this line of argument focuses on politician’s statements without 
regarding outcomes. Listening to these statements is important, but only when coupled 
with an examination of actual policy and practice. 
The domestic sphere plays a significant role, writes Roger E. Kanet and William 
E. Ferry. The dire economic conditions of the 1990’s, they believe, stoked the 
nationalism that many see as the motor of Russian foreign policy today.21 Bobo Lo 
seconds this opinion, writing that people living in the post-Soviet world want ‘stability in 
at least one sphere of life’, and don’t see why Russia cannot preserve ‘the good parts of 
the ancien regime,’ meaning enjoying regional hegemony and influence.22 
 To some in the field this is a reflection of the weakness of the Russian state, 
though that’s usually dependent on the time of their writing. Beissinger, discussing 
                                                        
21 Towards the Future: Emerging Trends in Russian Foreign Policy, Kanet, Roger and Ferry, William 
22 Lo, Bobo, 2002 (4) 
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Russia’s approach to Chechnya, writes that the attitude of ‘if we let Chechnya go, the 
whole federation will come tumbling down’ reflects the ‘softness’ of the Russian state.23 
Lo characterizes this as the ‘Potemkinization’ of Russian foreign policy; extravagant 
foreign policy concepts and statements function to create an illusion of Russia as a great 
power.24 Lapidus discusses this aspect within the context of Putin’s reign. She writes that 
Russian assertiveness with countries like Georgia is really just a response to insecurity 
over globalization, openness and the color revolutions.25 
 The problem with this approach is that Russia is indeed a legitimate power; 
whether or not Russia was powerful in the 1990s is debatable, but if that power ever 
waned, it is back. It becomes difficult, therefore, to argue that Russia is insecure. 
Tsygankov, however, gives a thoughtful response to this quandary. He writes a 
combination of local conditions and the behavior of Europe and the West leads to 
Russia’s foreign policy. Initial democratization combined with Western support led to 
attempts at integration. When economic conditions turned sour and NATO began 
expanding, Russia began ‘Great Power Balancing’, projecting itself as a great power 
while playing other powers off each other. Renewed support from the West, combined 
with economic recovery and local security threats led to Russia’s current state, which 
Tsygankov describes as ‘Great Power Pragmatism’.26  
This line of argument seems to overemphasize variation of Russian foreign policy 
over time. As we will see in the following case studies, drastic shifts in Russian foreign 
policy are rare and do not necessarily coincide with the arrival of Vladimir Putin; rather 
                                                        
23 Beissinger, 1995 (178) 
24 Lo, 2002 
25 Lapidus, 2007 (139) 
26 Tsygankov, Andrei, Russian Foreign Policy:Change and Continuity in National Identity, Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, Lantham, 2006 (20) 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they seem more in line with the arrivals of Mikhail Saakashvili and Viktor Yuschenko. 
This line of argument also fails to address variation across seemingly similar countries. 
Russian policy does vary over time, but it also varies across space. 
 In sum, the literature goes to great lengths to discuss the motivations and 
philosophies behind Russian foreign policy. We are presented with two main schools 
explaining Russian foreign policy and a pursuit of empire: one which poses geopolitical 
stability and ensuring a positive space for Russian interests in the near abroad, and a 
second which derives Russia’s domestic instability and insecurity as the root of foreign 
policy. 
 A much smaller literature, however, is a discussion of how Russia executes a 
particular course. The above authors focus mainly on the question of why Russian foreign 
policy is what it is, but few focus on how this is carried out and to what degree the 
Russian foreign policy is effective in achieving its goals. With the exception of Bugajski 
and Deyermond, the theorizing surrounding Russian pursuit of empire in its foreign 
policy stops short of answering two questions: how does Russia conduct its foreign 
policy? What effects does Russian foreign policy have on recipient states? 
Many of the scholars noted above, while thorough in their methodological rigor, 
base their arguments off ‘Foreign Policy Concepts’27 and public statements of 
government officials. These are important to note and follow closely, but they often do 
not reflect Russian foreign policy in practice. Russian officials are often just posturing 
and offering public relations chatter; it is far more indicative to look at a single aspect of 
Russian policy and how it has developed over time. This way an analysis of Russian 
                                                        
27  The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, printed in Ivanov, 2002 
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policy in action, not just in theory, can be developed. The work on Russian foreign policy 
is drastically lacking in this respect. Very few scholars reflect on how policy is carried 
out, a striking and essential part of connecting politicians statements with actual 
outcomes. If scholars cannot connect statements with outcomes by examining actual 
actions and methods of carrying out policy, then politician’s words provide little 
guidance to understanding policy impacts. 
 The following work will closely follow an operational aspect of Russian foreign 
policy: use of energy as leverage in the near abroad. I will argue that not only is the use 
of energy as leverage important, but how that energy is used is equally important. 
Different strategies of energy leverage may not be the main causes of different outcomes, 
but they contribute to different outcomes. The factors leading to these outcomes will be 
examined by careful study of a tangible strategy of carrying out foreign policy. The 
specific cases this work examines are Georgia and Ukraine. 
  
Explaining Energy in the Post-Soviet Space 
 
All of these modes of explanation attribute some of Russia’s successes and 
failures in accomplishing foreign policy goals to its use of energy. It is a rather 
inescapable fact given the sharp rise in energy prices between 2003 and July 2008 and the 
economic boom that coincided. Most of these scholars, however, simply note the 
importance of energy as a side factor, a tool in Russia’s arsenal of exerting influence and 
leverage on neighboring countries. The debate has ignored Russian energy as something 
to be examined in its own right. Oil and gas are the primary levers of Russian diplomacy 
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and are capable of stirring up enormous controversy and results (both positive and 
negative) each time they are utilized.  Major energy supply cuts and interruptions receive 
enormous media coverage.  
Yet, little detailed study of Russia’s energy maneuverings with neighbors have 
actually been conducted. It is beneficial, therefore to take a much closer look at Russian 
energy policies, which can lead to supply cuts that shake Europe or threats of gas 
shortages that raise hairs in the Caucasus. A closer look at energy interactions between 
Russia and its neighbors reveals that these events are culminations of ongoing wrangling 
and merely symbolic of greater processes and conflicts at work. Dramatic supply cuts do 
not happen all of the sudden; rather they are predictable ends. 
 Goldman’s Petrostate, for example, calls Russia an ‘energy superpower.’28 
Focusing more on the synergy between the Kremlin and Gazprom, he addresses Russia’s 
use of energy as leverage in its foreign policy. However, he only discusses the tactic of 
cutoffs. More importantly, Goldman discusses Russia’s use of energy in foreign policy 
uniformly. He poses Russian strategy as a general one without cross-country variation. 
Goldman lays out different events in the energy sphere but doesn’t theorize as to the 
differences and variations in outcomes and tactics. Different outcomes across the post-
Soviet space go largely unaddressed. 
 Janusz Bugajski, on the other hand, is very thorough in his discussion of different 
uses of energy as leverage and different strategies. Not only does he mention energy 
cutoffs, he explores other strategies, 
 
‘The energy industry became awash in cash during the last decade and could use these 
resources to purchase infrastructure and other assets. The easiest targets for Russian 
                                                        
28 Goldman, Marshall, Petrostate, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, 2008 
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investors are ‘debt-ridden, badly-run companies in poor, politically weak countries.’29 
Once Russian energy giants gain a foothold in a country they endeavor to increase their 
share of ownership in local companies either directly or working through nominally 
independent subsidiaries.’30 
 
Bugajski pays ample attention to this oft-ignored Russian use of energy leverage 
qualitatively. Bugajski, however, similarly discusses the Russian strategy in the near 
abroad as a uniform one across space. He only assesses variation within strategy by 
recognizing four targeted subzones: the Baltic region, Central Europe, Southeastern 
Europe and the European CIS.31 Moreover, he excludes Georgia and the Caucasus 
entirely. Like other scholars, Bugajski, even when dealing with energy, continue to group 
the CIS together, though there are large discrepancies between them in their relationships 
with Russia. 
  
The Cases: Why Ukraine and Georgia? 
 
I chose Ukraine and Georgia as my cases for several reasons: 1. Both are former 
Soviet republics. 2. Both are subject to Russian pressures. 3. Both experienced 
democratic, political revolutions in last several years. 4. Both are increasingly open to 
new influence from the United States and Western Europe. Why, then, are their outcomes 
so different? Georgia has reformed economically and politically fairly effectively, but 
was invaded by Russia in August 2008. Ukraine has failed to effectively reform even 
after the Orange Revolution, but is not subject to the threat of violent intervention from 
Russia. 
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30 Bugajski, 2004 (37) 





By engaging in more conflict-ridden, animosity-filled relations with Georgia, 
Russian energy leverage was eventually cut-off, forcing Russia to resort to other 
measures of coaxing desired outcomes from Georgian policymakers. Conflict-ridden 
relations led Georgia to purge Russian interests from their economy and reorient their 
energy dependence away from Russia. This removed a large impediment to violent 
conflict, since Russia no longer had its most effective tool of leverage at its disposal and 
forced the Russians to employ other methods of coercion. Clearing these hurdles helped 
pave the way for the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008. 
Energy leverage towards Ukraine, however, is more diffuse, contributing to less 
openly discordant relations between Russia and Ukraine and greater political infighting. 
Russian capital continues to play a meaningful role in Ukrainian politics. Russia’s 
moderate approach keeps their countries economic and energy interests intertwined. 
Furthermore, Russian uses of energy as leverage against Ukraine affect Europe. Violent 
conflict, therefore, isn’t a likely scenario between Ukraine and Russia. The Kremlin, 
however, through its capital and energy interests, continues to stoke bickering and 
political infighting between Ukrainian politicians, thus stalling reform and the embrace of 
NATO in a subtler and probably more effective manner. The relationships of Ukraine and 
Georgia with Russia are further clarified by the following diagram (Figure 2.1). When 
using energy as leverage, Russia has two different routes. One is moderation and the 
other is conflict. Conflict leads to reorganization of energy policy and end of dependence 
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as an anti-imperial reaction, whereas moderation leads to internal political divisions and a 
muddled response to Russia’s exertions of empire. The first route leads to energy 















 What sets the two countries apart? Why does Russia employ different energy 
strategies with Georgia and Ukraine? How do these strategies contribute to our 
understanding of Russia’s ability to achieve imperial ambitions? Two factors dictate 
different approaches from the Russian side. The first issue is one of demography and 
cultural relations. Ukraine’s Eastern half has many ethnic Russians and continues to 
support moves towards re-integrating with Russia, whereas Georgia does not remotely 
approach Ukraine’s level of pro-Russian sentiment. The second factor separating the two 
countries is one of transit revenues. The bulk of Russian gas and oil sold to Western 
Europe goes through Ukrainian pipelines. This creates an enormous linkage between 
Ukraine and Europe; major maneuvers against Ukraine can be seen as strikes against 
Europe, as evidenced by January’s gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia.   
Levitsky and Way argue that reform and democratization depends on two factors: 
firstly, the more linkages a country has with the West, the greater the likelihood there will 
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be reform. Second, the more leverage a post-Soviet country has over Western countries, 
the less likely it is to cede to Western pressures and democratize. In their article 
“Linkage, Leverage, and the Post-Communist Divide”, Lucan Way and Steven Levitsky 
argue that these two factors, more than any, determine outcomes.32 My work argues that 
indeed, linkage and leverage are very important, but not quite in the same manner as 
Levitsky and Way depict. Rather, linkage and leverage work in the opposite fashion in 
the cases of Ukraine and Georgia, where fewer linkages with the West and less leverage 
over Russia make a country more likely to reform. Greater linkages with the West and 
more leverage over Russia make a country less likely to reform.  
In their treatment of linkage, Levitsky and Way identify six types of linkages that 
nations have with each other: economic, intergovernmental, social, information, civil 
society and geographic linkages. Linkages can be trade, educational exchanges, cultural 
interaction or just the give-and-take that proximity engenders. Whatever they are, the 
authors determine that more linkages between a country and the West breed a more 
successful consolidation of democracy.33 
 The other factor Levitsky and Way see as determining outcomes is leverage with 
Western nations. The greater the leverage the post-Soviet country has over the west, the 
less likely they are to enact democratic reforms and consolidate democracy since the west 
will be unable or unwilling to apply pressure. The less leverage the country has over the 
west, the less likely authoritarianism is to persist, since they will be more susceptible to 
                                                        
32 Levitsky and Way do not use the term ‘leverage’ in the same way I’ve been using it throughout this 
work. Levitsky and Way are referring to leverage in regards to newly-independent post-Soviet state’s 
ability to resist Western influence on account of resource wealth or geographic positioning that leaves them 
less exposed to Western pressures. I am using leverage to discuss Russian influence and ability to exert that 
influence. 
33 Way, Lucan and Levitsky, Steven, Linkage, Leverage, and the Post-Communist Divide, Eastern 
European Politics and Societies, 2007, 21, 48-67 
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western pressures. These two factors, the authors argue, account for the democracies of 
East Central Europe and Southeastern Europe as opposed to the fifteen former Soviet 
republics that continue to lean towards autocracy and Russian authority. Ukraine, 
however, is singled out as the sole exception among post-Soviet republics as a successful 
democracy, though it seems premature given the fragility of Ukrainian democracy.  
 Levitsky and Way’s argument should be inverted if we are to apply it to energy 
relations in the Russian near abroad. On account of Ukraine’s linkages with Western 
Europe and resulting leverage over Russia, Russia uses a much more moderate approach. 
This approach, in the long run, leads to Ukrainian reform being stalled and parliamentary 
infighting. Georgia, on the other hand, lacks linkages with the West and lacks leverage 
over Russia. Georgia only transfers energy to Armenia, and not European countries. 
Therefore, Georgia has less leverage over Russia as an energy transporter, and lacks the 
same linkages that Ukraine has. Yet Georgia emerged as a successful reformer, whereas 
Ukraine stalled. Linkage and leverage matter, but in the opposite way Levitsky and Way 
illustrate. This work argues that the effects of linkage and leverage vary across issue 
areas and even across specific resources.  
 In the case of energy, fewer linkages and less leverage allowed Russia to employ 
a more belligerent approach, which in turn forced Georgia to realign their energy interests 
and take steps to end dependence. Ukraine, however, has linkages with the West and 
consequently leverage over Russia. This led to Ukraine continually bargaining with 
Russia and a more moderate approach from Russia, leading to little action in Ukraine to 
wean Ukrainians off Russian dependence. 
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 Levitsky and Way’s argument, moreover, does not explain the variations within 
the post-Soviet republics. If Ukraine is a successful outcome (which is still in question, 
though it is performing better than the rest of the FSU), then it is not on account of 
linkage and leverage. Ukraine seems to have significantly fewer linkages than the 
democracies of Eastern and Central Europe. In addition, Ukraine possesses greater 
leverage over the west in terms of gas transit routes, which was put on display for a good 
part of January 2009. Nor is Georgia’s situation explained by this argument. Georgia’s 
civil society and democracy has made leaps and bounds since Saakashvili took office. 
Western leverage over Georgia does exist in the form of the benefits of NATO 
membership, but that leverage was shown to be a flaccid one during the August 2008 
war. Russian leverage is far greater as Georgia’s once dominant energy supplier; the 
western-backed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline that passes through Tbilisi is, if anything, leverage 
for Georgia over the west rather than vice-versa. There are information and economic 
linkages increasing between Georgia and the west, but one would be hard-pressed to pin 
Georgia’s move towards the west solely on these. 
As I argued above, studies on empire and energy need to take points of variation 
across issues, across resources, and across states more seriously. Hence the linkages 
relationship sometimes works in exact opposition to Levitsky and Way’s model, 
particularly in the framework of energy leverage in Georgia and Ukraine.  
The cases to follow will show how important this variation is and why it must be 
considered. Russia’s different strategies of energy as leverage are not the sole reasons for 
different outcomes in Ukraine and Georgia. Indeed, their outcomes are a composite of 
many factors. Yet energy cannot be avoided. Russia took two different approaches to the 
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two countries: towards Ukraine, Russia uses a strategy of moderation. Towards Georgia, 
Russia uses a belligerent strategy of escalation. Accordingly, the results and success of 
Russian policy were varied. With Ukraine, Russia has successfully used leverage and 
continues to be irreversibly intertwined with Ukrainian interests and can therefore 
continue to exert influence. With Georgia, Russia lost leverage and was forced to resort 
to other measures of leverage to steer Georgian politics, like military force. These 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                 The Ukrainian Case 
 
New Years Day is always a testy time when it comes to natural gas—the weather 
is cold, contract periods come to an end and debts are owed. It was especially tense in 
2009 as Ukraine and Russia failed to reach an agreement on the 2009 price of gas and 
Ukraine’s $600 million debt before New Years. Russia turned off their gas on January 1st, 
prodding the Ukrainian government to accept their terms, a fairly normal course of events 
in an Eastern European January. 
On January 7th, however, gas pressures began falling all across Europe, perking 
concerns amongst EU countries. Bulgaria, Italy and Serbia all started complaining they 
were only received 2/3 of their gas pressure. Accusations flew back and forth: Ukraine 
claimed that Gazprom turned off all gas and the Kremlin accused Ukraine of stealing gas 
intended for Europe. The EU scrambled to find a course of action, and what was 
normally a bilateral scuffle saw the entry of another player. 
Over the past few years, the EU became increasingly wary of Russian use of 
energy as leverage. In this dispute, however, their suspicion was aroused about the other 
player: Ukraine. Most January gas shutoffs in the past lasted only a couple of days, but 
this one was dragging into its second week. Many already accused Ukraine’s Prime 
Minister, Yulia Tymoshenka, of being hardheaded and unrealistic (especially regarding 
energy disputes). On January 10th, the EU agreed to send monitors to Ukraine’s eastern 
and western borders to watch for siphoning, as per the Kremlin’s request. The gas didn’t 
start flowing, though, and Ukraine and Russia continued to swap allegations. 
On January 15th, Dmitri Medvedev invited Tymoshenka and EU leaders to 
Moscow to settle the dispute, hoping to appear as a conciliator as Russian credibility was 
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faltering. A deal was finally reached on January 19th—Ukraine would pay $150 per 1000 
cubic meters, according to Tymoshenka. This was far less than the $179 that Ukraine 
paid in 2008 and nowhere near the nearly $400 most European countries paid. The issue 
of the outstanding debt was not clearly resolved.121 
Nominally, Ukraine emerged out the dispute as the victor. The gas price was 
lowered, the debt issue put off, and their rival Gazprom lost over $1 billion in revenue 
during the nearly three week cutoff. Strategically, however, Ukraine lost mightily. One of 
their only remaining gambits to counter Moscow’s advantage was their European allies. 
The whole dispute made Ukraine’s reliability as an ally questionable—would Ukraine be 
willing to make compromises and realistic deals in the future as it vies for NATO and 
eventually EU membership? Was Ukraine’s economic base so dire that it refused to pay 
even half what Europe pays for gas? Was Ukraine no better than Russia, playing with 
Europe’s energy security? Perhaps even worse for Ukraine, Russia emerged from the 
dispute looking like the reasonable partner, sacrificing business interests to serve 
European interests as a whole. 
The culmination of the gas cutoff was really a microcosm of Russia’s successful 
use of energy as leverage with Ukraine. Russian business ties in Ukraine, combined with 
Ukraine’s use of Europe as a bargaining chip with Russia left Kiev fractured and unable 
to make reasonable concessions. Though Russia lost that particular dispute economically, 
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Ukrainian relations with Russia are characterized by the Kremlin using its 
resources and supply as an enormous lever over Ukraine. Manifestations of leverage, 
however, often consist of Russia making concessions. Moscow’s threats are usually to 
halt concessions, frequently regarding relief of Ukraine’s perpetual debts to their eastern 
neighbor. Outright cutoffs are much less prevalent because Ukraine holds its own 
leverage over Russia. By controlling Russia’s main pipeline routes to Western Europe, 
Ukraine possesses two advantages. Ukraine controls the flow of the bulk of Russian 
supply, and by bordering Western Europe, gains a considerable ally to deter Russian use 
of energy as leverage (as an impetus not to sever supply). Russia, however, in its 
concessions, still manages to capture large sections of Ukrainian industry and business. 
By trading energy debts for stakes in particular industries and companies, Russia 
increases its share of ownership in Ukrainian business. Ukraine is still a divided country 
where half the population is sympathetic to Russia (namely the Eastern half). The results 
of Russia’s different tack with Ukraine are consequently less openly conflict-ridden than 
with Georgia, and Russia’s moderate approach, coupled with the divided nature of 
Ukrainian politics, led to Russian leverage enduring amidst political infighting in Kiev 
between a Yulia Tymoshenka-led Parliament and a Yuschenko-led Presidential cabinet. 
The Ukrainian case suggests that geographic positioning along export routes is 
almost as important as having the resources themselves, as long as the transit country 
does not extensively abuse their advantage. The cases of energy-rich Central Asian 
countries, for example, suggest that Russia, their main viable export route, is still able to 
control a great deal in their political realms. Likewise Ukraine has immense leverage over 
Russia with their pipeline network leading to Europe. Russia, though, is developing 
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alternative routes that weaken Ukraine’s still vulnerable position. Ukraine imported 90% 
of their gas from Russia in the years immediately following the breakup of the 
USSR122—for all the pressures Kiev can exert over Russia, the Kremlin still has the last 
word, even more so since the ascension of Vladimir Putin. 
Russia though, does not always use leverage directly. As with Georgia, Russia 
uses third-party companies, which do not have direct ties with the Kremlin, to exert 
pressure. Companies like Itera and Nafokhaz Ukrainiy do not directly implicate Russian 
meddling, but push Ukraine towards pandering to Russian interests by means of injecting 
Russian interests in the Ukrainian economy. 
 
Ukraine’s Third Party Trading Companies 
 
Russian third-party trading companies operated in Ukraine throughout the period 
after the fall of the Soviet Union, but only became the central topics of dispute in 
Yuschenko’s Presidency. They were given freer rein during Kuchma’s years, handing 
billions of dollars of contracts with almost no questioning of their origins or intentions. 
EuralTransGas is one example of a shady partner of Ukraine’s that should have been 
scrutinized by legislatures before being given immense power and control. The trading 
company was registered to three Romanians with no business background and an Israeli 
with ties to a Ukrainian mobster. The company, registered to a small Hungarian village, 
stood to gain over $1 billion in profits. EuralTransGas gained prominence when Alexi 
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Miller, having sworn to disband the embattled Itera, handed its contracts for Turkmen gas 
to Ukraine over to EuralTransGas before the company was even fully formed.123  
Yuri Boyko, the man who succeeded Vitaly Hayduk as the Fuel and Energy 
Minister, was head of Naftokhaz Ukrainiy when the company provided EuralTG with 
their contracts—it is clear both in his advocating of the Nord Stream project and his 
support for EuralTG, sustained by $300 million of loans from Gazprom, that Naftokhaz 
was not pursuing Ukrainian interests but those of the Ukrainian political elite. While 
EuralTransGas funneled money out of Gazprom for various uses, Naftokhaz did the same 
for the Ukrainians. When Oleksiy Ivchenko resigned as head of Naftokhaz, the company 
had already taken out $6 billion in loans and handed over many trading rights to 
RozUkrEnergo.124 
 The spring of 2008 saw another debt dispute as Russia and Ukraine argued over 
what the actual prices of gas were—the actual amounts of money, being ferried through 
various trading companies, became convoluted and thus always a subject for debate. 
Gazprom accused Naftokhaz of not paying pack debt in February 2008,125 and cut gas 
supplies on March 3rd.126 This led Yulia Tymoshenka to argue that contracts with 
RozUkrEnergo should be abolished and gas bought directly from Naftokhaz.127 
Tymoshenka was simply trying to gain greater control of Ukrainian gas, since 
RozUkrEnergo was charging a lower price than Naftokhaz would have—many reckoned 
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RozUkrEergo was doing this precisely as an incentive for Ukraine not to push for NATO 
membership.128 
 
Period 1: The Fall of the Soviet Union: Russia and Ukraine Grasp for the Spoils 
 
Immediately following the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia and Ukraine were 
saddled with debates on the division of some of the Soviet Union’s most important assets. 
As in Georgia, energy leverage played a key role in dictating some of these early issues. 
Three stand out in particular. First, the breakup of the union led to the creation of four 
newly independent nuclear states overnight. Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan all 
possessed nuclear weapons, viewed as a great hazard by both Russia, viewing itself as the 
regional stabilizer, and the West. The West (especially the US) and Russia sought to rein 
in Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus and force them to give up their nuclear weapons 
capabilities, hoping to whittle four nuclear states down to one. Second, Russia and 
Ukraine also both laid claim to the large Black Sea naval fleet. The third major issue was 
the terms of inclusion in the newly-formed Coalition of Independent States (CIS). All 
these would be topics that incurred Russia’s use of energy as leverage in the first three 
years of independence. A fourth issue, more publicized but less an arena for energy 
leverage, was ownership of the Crimea. 
 Ukraine’s government quickly agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapons, though 
sections of Ukrainian Parliament hectored President Leonid Kravchuk not to, viewing 
them as an effective gambit against Russia. Kravchuk, however, correctly calculated that 
Ukraine would gain legitimacy and respect by not toying with an issue grave as nuclear 
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weapons. The debate, however, was about oversight for the dismantling. At a CIS summit 
in March 1992, Kravchuk demanded ‘international supervision’ for the removal of 
nuclear weapons.129 Russia, however, gained the upper hand in negotiating the weapons 
by using Ukrainian debt and energy shortages. In exchange for cancelling a portion of 
debt,130 Russia took control of 176 missiles and 1,800 warheads. A portion of the 
uranium extracted from the warheads was then returned to Ukraine for processing as 
fuel.131 
 The division of the Black Sea Fleet was more of a tug-of-war and not completely 
resolved until 1997 (and still unresolved in respect to the status of sailors in Sevastopol). 
In January 1994 Russia agreed to cancel Ukraine’s gas debts in exchange for handing 
over the Ukrainian portion of the Black Sea Fleet and cementing the nuclear weapons 
agreement.132 By possessing a large portion of the Fleet which was not handed over 
immediately, Ukraine held its own leverage over Russia, which Kravchuk made ample 
use of. When Russia cut gas supplies in March 1994 after Ukraine accrued more debt, 
Kravchuk threatened to pull out of the deal if Russia did not immediately resume 
delivery.133 Russia turned on gas supplies a couple days later, but started pressuring 
Ukraine for a share in their pipeline network and their underground storage facilities, a 
trend to continue for years to come.134 
 Russian and Ukrainian energy maneuverings in March 1994 were also related to 
the CIS and the two countries differing views on what the function of the CIS should be. 
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Russia inevitably regarded itself in the 1990’s as the successor to the Soviet state, and 
viewed the CIS as a means of replicating the sovereignty model of the Soviet Union.135 
The Soviet model of sovereignty, in regards to Soviet satellites and republics, was a dual 
model, in which states possess their own independent sovereignty, but also must adhere 
to the sovereignty of the socialist vanguard (Moscow).  If the two clashed, the Soviet 
republic or satellite must defer to the union as a whole. This second sovereignty helped 
Moscow defend against ‘imperialist encroachment.’136  “The time has come,” Yeltsin 
said in March 1993, “for the appropriate international organizations to grant Russia 
special powers as the guarantor of peace and stability on the territory of the former 
union.”137 
 Russia viewed the CIS precisely through this lens, and therefore sought to use the 
CIS as a vehicle to keep their former influence intact in the face of NATO expansion or 
other possible threats to their sphere of influence. Ukraine, however, rejected this 
conception of dual sovereignties and sought to adopt a more Western model of 
sovereignty,138 one that roughly views the concept of sovereignty as a guarantor of 
equality between countries. Ukraine therefore understandably spent March 1994 lobbying 
against a Russian proposal to attain observer status at the UN for the CIS139—observer 
status would grant the CIS the right to use peacekeeping troops, which could be a threat 
to Ukraine’s independence and control over the Crimea, which Nikita Khrushchev gave 
to Ukraine in 1954.  
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 Amidst pressure to give up pipeline rights and the threat of the CIS acting as an 
instrument of Russian power, Kuchma cleverly parlayed the first Chechen conflict to 
Ukraine’s advantage. The Kremlin attempted to persuade Ukraine by rescheduling debt in 
exchange for pipeline ownership rights—Kuchma responded by saying it would be illegal 
to surrender such rights, but also expressed his support for Russia against Chechen 
separatists. His rationale for supporting the Kremlin against Chechen separatists was that 
territorial integrity was of the utmost importance—a roundabout way of saying they’d 
keep the disputed Crimea.140 Kuchma was in part, however, responding to his own 
government. Vice-Premier Vasily Yevtukhov extensively lobbied for the creation of joint 
ventures between Gazprom and the Ukrainian government, but was rebuffed by 
Ukrainian Parliament.141 
 Throughout this first period, energy prices were considerably lower than their 
later levels. It was, however, still an important mechanism as both countries scrambled 
for resources and money during the early painful stages of shock therapy. Russia 
successfully used energy as leverage regarding the nuclear issue (though many other 
factors came in to play). Kravchuk and Kuchma, however, both put their leverage over 
Russia to work in this period. Both had similar economic situations at the time and 
energy prices were low. Those factors, compounded by the lingering euphoria of 
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Period 2: 1996-2000: Ukraine Seeks Alternative, Squanders Advantages 
 
In early 1996, disputes began to revolve less around specific political issues and 
more in regard to Ukraine’s general orientation and independence in making decisions 
affecting Russia’s export pipelines. Without consulting Moscow, Ukraine raised transit 
fees 10% on the Druzhba pipeline in January. Russia’s oil companies protested raising 
the transit fees, which would inevitably move some profits out of their hands and into the 
Ukrainian pipeline operator’s coffers. Ukraine, however, turned the tables by shutting off 
pipelines to Europe, which at the time exported 57 million tons of Russian oil to Western 
Europe annually. The Russian oil companies quickly accepted the rate increase.142 This 
event represents the strong influence that Ukraine exerted over Russia and emphasizes 
the rationale behind Russia’s efforts to gain stakes in Ukrainian pipelines. Georgia lacks 
similar leverage, since their pipelines from Russia only supply tiny Armenia. Without 
their neighbors’ pipes, Russia cannot do much in the way of exporting. Russia struck 
back, however, cutting off supplies to Ukraine while Leonid Kuchma was in Washington 
in February,143 a gentle reminder that Ukraine wasn’t freed from angst yet. Turning off 
the gas to Europe would of course disappear as a viable tool for Ukraine after the Orange 
Revolution as they sought closer ties with NATO. Ukraine still wanted to tread somewhat 
carefully, as certain economic boons were constantly at risk: Russia sold Ukraine gas at a 
large discount, and Ukraine reaps large transit revenues from Russian gas, two factors 
that continue to buoy their feeble economy. 
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 Ukraine’s boldness in manipulating its pipelines in February 1996 also led Russia 
to start seeking alternatives to the Druzhba export route. Russia began seeking a pipeline 
to circumvent Ukraine and scatter Kiev’s advantage.144 Russia also began making efforts 
to ramp up debt to Ukrainian enterprises in an effort to eventually seize control of them. 
Russia created arrears for the Azovstal and Ilyich steel companies—their debts to 
Gazprom amounted to $58 million in 1996. Gazprom was previously importing steel 
from the two plants at discount prices, but was planning on attempting to take over the 
two companies once the government completed plans for privatization.145 Ukrainian 
officials, however, got wind of Gazprom’s intentions and sold off shares as quickly as 
possible to joint stock companies insulated from Gazprom’s interests.146 Gazprom 
attempted to stop importing Ukrainian steel and switched to Russian steel in response to 
the perceived backsliding.147 
 Though Russia was unsuccessful at acquiring the Ukrainian steel-makers, the 
event marked the beginning of a Russian strategy to use their third-party trading 
companies, such as Itera, to acquire Ukrainian assets and disrupt Ukrainian politics. In 
early spring of 1997, Itera cut off gas deliveries from Turkmenistan to Ukraine in 
anticipation of a Ukrainian delegation visiting the United States to discuss alternatives to 
Russian energy.148 When gas was cut, Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov bluntly 
blamed Itera. “This is not so much Kiev’s fault,” he said, “as that of the intermediary 
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firms that supply gas from Turkmenistan to Ukraine.”149 Niyazov’s frankness was an 
embarrassing incident for Itera in their efforts to gain viability. Days later Yulia 
Tymoshenka visited the US—Tymoshenka was at the time both a lawmaker and 
President of UESU, a gas distribution company.150 This doesn’t discredit Tymoshenka 
since there is extraordinary synergy between energy companies and government in the 
former Soviet Union, but it certainly casts a suspicious shadow over her lobbying for 
greater control of Ukrainian energy policy and greater autonomy from Russia. Given the 
low salaries of Ukrainian officials, business motivations might play a greater role than the 
national interest. After announcing she’d cut her salary in half in March 2009 to help 
cope with the financial crisis, Tymoshenka only stands to make around $16,000 annually 
as Prime Minister.151 
 Turkmenistan would later cancel Leonid Kuchma’s planned visit to Ashgabat, 
citing the debts run up by Itera—at the time, Itera was responsible for $205 million, 
which they blamed on Ukrainian consumers.152 This provided an example of Russia’s use 
of Itera to subdue Ukraine. With Itera creating debt disputes, Russia no longer needed to 
use direct leverage against Ukraine—instead they could use third-party companies to 
create disputes between their neighbors and push Ukraine’s indebted enterprises towards 
privatization (and potential takeover by Russians). The Kremlin could claim 
blamelessness for energy problems and exert leverage over Ukraine indirectly so as to 
skirt condemnation, but still continue to elbow its way in on ownership stakes. These are 
undoubtedly important, since they are a cunning attempt at exerting Russian influence 
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that often goes unreported, or is often characterized as an individual firms tiff with 
Ukraine as opposed to the Kremlin’s hand. 
 In late 1997, Russia and Ukraine both furthered development of alternatives, both 
in response to and in anticipation of Ukraine further shifting its orientation westward. In 
late August, Ukraine allowed NATO to conduct naval exercises on the Black Sea, and 
conducted a joint humanitarian mission with troops from the US, Turkey, Georgia, 
Romania and Bulgaria.153 The same day, Shell announced its plans to ship gas to Ukraine 
from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan bypassing Russia via Iran and Turkey.154 Ukraine, it 
seemed, was bracing for a Russian response to their warm treatment of NATO and Black 
Sea neighbors. Only days later Ukraine would decline investment offers from LUKOil in 
large Ukrainian refineries (LUKOil, it should be noted, operates far more freely from the 
Kremlin’s interest and is much more akin to Western oil companies than Gazprom or 
TNK).155 Later in the fall, Russia would respond to Ukraine’s development of alternatives 
with their own alternatives. Rem Vyakhirev, chairman of Gazprom, confirmed rumors 
that Russia would build a gas pipeline under the Black Sea to Turkey. The pipeline, he 
explained, would bypass Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine in case of ‘political 
instability’.156 
 Ukraine, however, was making a large mistake by disentangling itself from 
Russia in such a fashion. In their mutual dependence, Ukraine had a great deal more to 
lose than Russia, and in trying to move away from Russian energy imports simply to 
assert independence Ukraine may have lost sight of the bigger picture. The prospect of 
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Ukraine completely weaning itself off of Russian gas is little more than fantasy, 
especially since Russia sells Ukraine gas at a discount price. Russia, however, can and 
has been constructing pipelines to circumvent Ukraine, both south through the Black Sea 
and north through the Baltic Sea to Germany. Ukraine stood to lose transit tariffs and a 
monopoly on Russia’s resources amidst economic crisis, whereas Russia stood to lose 
one consumer and pipeline route amidst what became a burgeoning economy. Ukraine 
wasn’t prudent in daring Russia to invest in alternatives and erode their only leverage 
over Moscow. 
 The winter and spring of 1998 were characterized by very little decisive action, 
perhaps in response to a global financial downturn that hit the former Soviet Union 
especially hard. Both sides were probably more interested in laying back and examining 
the developments of each other’s alternatives. Kuchma also appeared to be taking a less 
combative stance towards Russia as both of their economies plunged into hyperinflation 
in 1998. There were important developments, however, regarding third-party companies. 
Russia was capable of punishing Ukraine indirectly throughout 1998 as they feuded with 
Turkmenistan over gas prices and Itera’s involvement in Turkmen gas sales. When 
Turkmenistan tried to charge a higher price for gas (which was to be shipped through 
Russia to Ukraine) and terminated Itera’s contracts, Russia blocked their gas exports to 
Ukraine in January 1998.157 Gazprom insisted that they would not resume shipments 
unless Turkmenistan included Itera in any new contracts.158 The move was intended to 
cow Turkmenistan into submission, but backfired and caused their President, Saparmurat 
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Niyazov, to embrace alternatives. It did, however, make Ukraine more dependent on 
Russian gas, and the two countries continued to work around Ukraine’s $1.2 billion debt 
to Russia.159 
 In agreeing to restructure some of Ukraine’s debt, however, Russia insisted on the 
formation of Naftokhaz Ukrainiy, which would consist of several state-owned companies 
but ‘invite private investment on a selective basis.’160 This was perhaps the most 
important act to come out of the largely quiet spring of 1998. While Ukraine refused to 
include Ukrgazprom, the owner of the pipeline network, in the deal, Nafthokhaz Ukrainiy 
helped set the stage for third-party trading companies to further their pro-Russian 
activities in Ukraine. Naftokhaz Ukrainiy was created by a combination of Russian and 
Ukrainian interests—it vacillated between serving each of those interests but served as a 
vital access point for Russians throughout.  
 Energy interactions resumed their political tone in the fall of 1998. In October, 
Ukraine demanded the right to send troops along with Russia to the Transdniestr region 
of Moldova (which borders Ukraine).161 Russia responded to Ukraine’s request by 
resuming construction on the pipeline through Belarus, which avoided Ukraine and 
presented an alternate route.162 
 Ukrainians were constantly facing accusation of siphoning off gas and oil 
intended for Western Europe and using it themselves for free. This was the key issue 
concerning use of energy leverage throughout 1999, leading to Russian threats of 
collecting Ukraine’s debt, but little change in the fundamental issues. Russia did cut off 
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oil in early January to punish possible siphoning and threatened not to restructure the 
growing $2.2 billion debt.163 
  
Period 3: Fall 2000-Fall 2004: The Successful Use of Russian Leverage 
 
The fall of 2000 marked a dramatic turning point. Leonid Kuchma, while never 
combative towards Russia, began acceding more towards Russian demands. Kuchma’s 
turn eastward in the dwindling years of his Presidency are remarkably similar to the end 
of Shevardnadze’s Presidency in Georgia when he began allowing Russian companies 
access to Georgia. Kuchma’s increasing concessions to Russia may have been the result 
of Russia’s alternatives to Ukraine’s pipeline network gaining viability. He may also 
have been shook by the rising prices of gas and oil, hoping Russia would be the easiest 
route to price discounts. Another possibility is that Vladimir Putin appeared readier to use 
energy as a weapon than his predecessor, forcing Kuchma to choose between Russia and 
the West. Either way, it was becoming clearer in dealings between the two that Ukraine’s 
advantages over Russia were dissolving. 
As Russia signed a deal with Slovakia and Poland to build another pipeline 
bypassing Ukraine and further eroding Kiev’s dwindling advantages,164 Kuchma broke 
down that same week and offered a 10% stake in Ukraine’s pipeline network if Russia 
would agree to assist in modernizing the network.165 Only days later, Kuchma fired his 
foreign minister, Boris Tarasyuk, who was ardently pro-West, just in time to reach a deal 
with Vladimir Putin to provide Ukraine with energy supplies through the winter (This 
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event stands in stark opposition to the dismissal of David Mirtskhulava in Georgia).166 
Here Russia clearly parlayed its multitude of options into getting what it wanted. Russia’s 
prize was always a stake in Ukrainian pipelines, something Kiev desperately defended, 
but as new options came to the fore in the form of another pipeline, Ukraine was forced 
to concede. Russia’s control of energy leverage (and consequently Ukraine’s revenue 
stream) convinced Ukraine to start doing the one thing they claimed they would never 
do—surrender the pipeline.  
Putin made Kuchma’s choice of orientation even easier during the winter. After 
Ukrainian journalist Georgy Gongadze, a prominent critic of the government, was 
murdered, recordings surfaced linking Kuchma to the murder. The IMF, suspicious of 
Kuchma’s involvement, froze a $2.6 billion loan. Putin immediately seized the 
opportunity, comforting Ukraine with statements that they would surely be able to settle 
debt disputes,167 and initiating shipments of cheap electricity and reconnecting severed 
power grids in exchange for coal shipments.168 The rest of 2001 was little more than a 
series of conciliatory statements coming from both sides. With Ukraine placated 
temporarily, Russia announced the opening of the Sukhodolnaya-Rodionovskaya pipeline 
bypassing Ukraine and further cementing Russia’s advantage.169 
Kuchma faced a major foreign policy choice, and the health of the sputtering 
Ukrainian economy depended on it in both in the short and long-term. He could begin 
enacting western reforms and embrace European and American-style institutions, moving 
his orientation completely away from Russia, as Ukraine was swiftly losing its bargaining 
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chips with Russia. The other option was to cozy back up to Russia and hope their eastern 
neighbor was capable and willing to forget their past transgressions. To carry out the 
necessary reforms and effectively cut off Russian influence in Ukraine would have 
required a dramatic reimagining of Ukrainian politics; Kuchma’s Herculean checklist 
would have included purging corruption from a chronically corrupt political elite already 
extensively tangled in Russian interests, along with placating half of Ukraine’s citizens, 
who were not eager to leave Moscow’s bosom. Thirdly, he would have had to find a way 
to solve the Ukrainian energy crisis without Russia, and yet ensure that gas and oil 
continued to reach Western Europe. These labors proved insurmountable, leading 
Kuchma to choose the easier solution and look to the east.  
Both Saakashvili and Shevardnadze were faced with the same choice when it 
came to dealing with Russia, but a number of factors made it easier for Georgia to spurn 
Russia and turn westward. Georgia had less to lose in terms of influence and leverage 
from transit and business ties, and Georgia lacked a similarly pro-Russian half of the 
electorate. Furthermore, though Russian business interests meddled in Georgia, they were 
far less openly intertwined with Russian business. Their arrangements were both shadier 
and fewer in number and value than those between Ukraine and Russia, making them 
easier to cast aside. Ukraine turning westward, therefore, would have been much riskier 
than the equivalent move from Georgia. 
Consequently, the last three years of Kuchma’s Presidency were marked by 
moves to curry favor with Russia. Naftokhaz Ukrainiy, in October 2002, formed a 
consortium with Russia and German companies to transport gas via the Nord-Stream 
pipeline through the Baltic Sea. Ukraine’s endorsement of the project was puzzling, since 
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it was providing Germany a means of obtaining Russian gas without using Ukrainian 
territory. Yulia Tymoshenka furiously denounced the decision, saying the development of 
the project would surely cost Ukraine more than half of the $2 billion annually collected 
from transit fees.170 This may have been the apex of Russian energy leverage, as they got 
Ukraine to participate in a project that directly contradicted their own economic interests. 
Naftokhaz Ukrainiy, a medium of interaction between Russians and Ukrainians, only 
made the deal seem murkier. The Ukrainian members of Naftokhaz, it seemed, sold out 
Ukraine’s interests.171 This incident, in particular, showed how business partnerships and 
involvement didn’t help Ukraine, but gave Russia greater leverage and terms with 
Ukraine. Utilizing an instrument that the two countries created together, Russia served its 
interests at Ukraine’s expense. Diffusion of conflict, handshakes and signed contracts 
only fed Ukrainian dependence.  
Just over a year later, Ukrainian Minister of Fuel and Energy Vitaly Hayduk 
announced that Ukraine would withdraw from the consortium with Russia and Germany. 
He also announced that Russia would not buy into the Ukrainian power grid, and 
downplayed suggestions that severing the Ukrainian power grid from the CIS grid 
(Russian-controlled) would be problematic. These announcements came one day after 
Kuchma met with Anatoly Chubais, the head of UES, the Russian electricity provider. 
The day after Hayduk’s press conference, Kuchma fired him for the mutinous 
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comments.172 Kuchma replaced Hayduk with Yuri Boyko, the former head of Naftokhaz 
Ukrainiy, which, as mentioned earlier, was formed in conjunction with Russian interests 
and was handling the financing and feasibility studies of the consortium with 
Germany.173 The maneuvering highlighted the fractures developing in Ukrainian politics 
between those faithful to an increasingly accommodating Leonid Kuchma and the 
staunchly anti-Russian block of Yuschenko and Tymoshenka (which would later 
disintegrate as well).  
Presidential elections were scheduled for the next fall, with the main candidates 
being Viktor Yanukovich, supported by the pro-Russian elements, and Viktor 
Yushchenko, supported by the pro-Western elements. Kuchma endorsed Yanukovich and 
gave him the benefit of the government’s advertising and propaganda.174 Putin also gave 
Yanukovich his backing, but avoided using energy as leverage in the fall of 2004; cutting 
gas supplies to affect election results would be too blatant and extensively damage 
Gazprom’s international reputation, analysts argued.175 Russia was, in a way, exercising 
leverage by keeping the gas on and making Yanukovich seem like a guarantor of 
stability. Effective in its own right, in addition, was Russia’s increased attention paid to 
the Blue Stream oil pipeline, another pipeline avoiding Ukraine, right around election 
time.176 
The election that followed was bitterly contested. After the first round of elections 
on October 31st, Yuschenko received the greatest number of votes despite reports of 
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falsifications. Yanukovich finished close behind. The second round of elections were 
held on November 21st, and the Central Election Commission crowned Yanukovich the 
winner of the Presidency despite charges of election fraud. Yuschenko supporters poured 
into the streets of Kiev protesting the results. While Yuschenko’s legal team appealed the 
decision in the Ukrainian Supreme Court, Yuschenko went into the streets to rally his 
supporters. Protestor’s energy waned, but a fiery speech from Yulia Tymoshenka 
revitalized their spirits and cemented her as a leader to be reckoned with. On December 
3rd, the court nullified the November election and set a new runoff date for December 
26th. Yuschenko won the repeat runoff by a margin of 7%.177 
  Tymoshenka and Yushchenko, both vehemently anti-Russian, ascended to power 
on a wave of mobilization that dramatically shifted the orientation and attitude of the 
Ukrainian government. For a time it appeared Ukraine would head in a remarkably new 
direction. The Orange Revolution, however radical, failed to change anything regarding 
Russia’s energy leverage over Ukraine or regain much of Ukraine’s leverage over Russia. 
Events changed quickly, but the realities of Ukraine’s uncomfortable position remained 
the same. Ukraine wasn’t about to swing around all that fast. 
 
Period 4: After the Orange Revolution: The Return of Successful Russian Energy 
Leverage 
 
While the incoming regime was far more oriented towards opening Ukrainian 
society towards the West and enacting democratic reforms, the difficulties that led 
Kuchma to renew his friendship with Russia remained. Gerhard Schroeder and Russia 
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finalized the details of the Nord-Stream pipeline in September 2005, strengthening 
Russia’s hand just in time for the fall and winter, when Ukraine would need their help the 
most.178 Putin fully intended on using this leverage to harass Ukraine over the shift of the 
Orange Revolution. Since they had aid from Western institutions pouring in, he 
remarked, Ukraine should be able to pay Western prices for gas, which at the time were 
$160 per 1000 cubic meters.179 Ukraine was at the time paying $50. 
December launched a series of price disputes which characterized Ukrainian 
relations with Russia over the coming winters. Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller threatened 
that if Ukraine did not agree to the new price, Gazprom would cut supplies.180 Ukrainian 
energy minister Ivan Plachkow said Ukraine was willing to pay $80181—to which deputy 
chairman of Gazprom Alexander Medvedev responded that if Ukraine did not stop 
‘dragging their feet’ on paying $160, the price would leap to $230. The dispute clearly 
had political implications. Vladimir Polokhalo, head of the Center of Political Thought in 
Kiev, surmised that Russia was finally getting its payback for the Orange Revolution a 
year earlier, and in turn warning other republics not to step out of line.182 
On New Year’s Day, just as Georgia erupted in anger over the explosions on their 
pipelines, Russia cut gas to Ukraine as Naftokhaz Ukrainiy claimed they would pay $95, 
and the rate would stay for the next five years.183 As parliamentary elections approached 
in March, it appeared that Russia was politicizing the gas price dispute. Ukraine, 
however, responded in kind by politicizing the gas dispute within their election 
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campaigns. Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the Duma’s international affairs 
committee, commented that Ukrainian elections play “a huge role in this situation…They 
have to think about March all the time, about how a solution to this problem and good or 
bad relations with Russia may affect their election ratings…Final strategic accords are 
more realistically to be achieved after the election campaign in Ukraine closes.”184 
Kosachev’s sentiment expresses one of the great problems in electoral politics: 
candidates must focus on their images and voter perception instead of realistic solutions. 
Certain pragmatic courses cannot be pursued if they will be seen as conciliatory to Russia 
and defeatist by a politician’s constituency. A great deal of politics becomes 
showmanship and trying to appear the most Ukrainian, most nationalist candidate instead 
of the candidate that best solves problems. Bickering, though an obstacle to real 
solutions, is a campaign strategy in divided Ukraine. 
 Furthermore, many politicians in Ukraine represented their own energy interests 
and still had deep ties with Russia, so there was no way to separate politics from the price 
dispute. There was little chance of a unified approach towards the energy crisis as 
different solutions had different implications for different politicians. The ties between 
Ukrainian politicians and energy companies led to political infighting and maneuvering 
rather than political solutions, especially around elections. Some politicians were 
vouching for RozUkrEnergro, and some for Naftokhaz Ukrainiy, a debate which, over the 
next two years, would emphasize how Russian-related energy companies clouded 
Ukraine’s political atmosphere. 
The Ukrainian parliament highlighted the political infighting when they voted to 
oust the entire cabinet of Prime Minister Yuri Yekhanurov, just a week after reaching a 
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new contract with Russia to solve the price dispute and continue supplies.185 Yekhanurov, 
after 100 days in office after replacing Tymoshenka’s cabinet, was fiercely critical of the 
Tymoshenka-led Parliament in the days before his dismissal. He went especially after 
Tymoshenka. She “could do a good job trading gas,” he said. “It is better to find some 
other job for Yulia.”186 After the Parliament voted out the Yuschenko-aligned 
Yekhanurov, the Premier refused to leave office, but withdrew his signature from a 
memorandum of understanding with Party of Regions leader Yanukovich.187 Yuschenko, 
who also withdrew his signature, declared the vote unconstitutional, allowing 
Yekhanurov to stay on. In return Yekhanurov alluded to pulling out of the contract and 
renegotiating the terms, though the price has stayed at $179.50.188 Yekhanurov viewed 
Tymoshenka as unrealistic and uncompromising in her attitude towards Russia. He 
believed that she didn’t grasp Ukraine’s lack of bargaining power and was suspicious of 
her connections within the industry. Tymoshenka, however, believed Yekhanurov was 
too accommodating and a poor negotiator. Her stubbornness and faith in herself as 
negotiator, however, would be disastrous for Ukraine later on in the dispute in January 
2009. 
The Parliament vote and Yuschenko’s refusal to fire his cabinet fractured the 
forces behind the Orange Revolution. Russia’s pressure on Ukraine regarding gas prices 
sufficiently polarized the reformers that they ran as competing parties in the March 
parliamentary elections, allowing the Russian-leaning Party of Regions to gain a 
majority. Yanukovich would regain power after the Parliament approved his accession to 
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the Premiership in August, though he would be succeeded by Tymoshenka months 
later.189 The splintering of the West-leaning reformers and Yanukovich’s return to 
prominence can be attributed to one factor: Russian energy leverage and advocating 
trading companies that represented Russian interests. 
 
 
 Russia has used its energy as leverage over Ukraine very successfully since the 
fall of the Soviet Union, but has done so through ranging methods. Under Kuchma, 
leverage was through co-opting the executive office. Under Yuschenko, it has resorted to 
fostering political infighting both within the legislative and between the legislative and 
executive branches. Russia’s moderate uses of energy leverage, such as making 
concessions and lowering prices with only a handful of cutoffs as opposed to frequent 
ones in other countries led to the diffusion of conflict and more internal disputes within 
Ukraine. Had Russia been more bellicose in their attitude towards Ukraine, they would 
have lost their Ukrainian sympathizers. Instead Russia sought to nurse those ties with 
their energy companies in an effort to sway Ukraine. This was partly a result of Ukraine’s 
leverages over Russia (that are quickly disappearing due to competing projects), but also 
the internal conflict they could stoke in Ukraine. Energy became increasingly politicized 
in Ukraine, and so Russia’s concessions and punishments towards Ukraine did not set off 
conflict against a belligerent Russia, but rather sparked rows within the Ukrainian 
political elite. Third-party trading companies helped to complicate the debate and fracture 
the Orange Revolutionaries. If anything, Russia’s use of energy leverage has shown 
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Ukraine to still be divided and lacking the institutions necessary for effective monitoring 
























 Scholars have done plenty of work predicting outcomes in Eastern Europe and 
retrenching regimes in Central Asia; that much is abundantly clear. With countries in 
between, however, such as Georgia and Ukraine, there is little work examining the 
reasons for their varying outcomes. Instead, readers are left to examine the motivations 
and explanations for Russian foreign policy. Examinations of Russian foreign policy in 
general are the only real tools to determine the trajectories of this group of states.  
 General examinations of Russian foreign policy and its pursuit of empire in the 
near abroad, however, are laced with shortcomings. Explanations do not account for 
different policies and outcomes in Georgia and Ukraine; the debate would have readers 
believe outcomes will be the same in countries that border Russia. There is variation and 
it warrants a careful explanation. 
 This work attempts to provide part of that explanation. Using an operational 
aspect of Russian foreign policy, I established that Russia employs distinct strategies of 
foreign relations in the near abroad. These distinct strategies point readers towards a 
better understanding of variations in seemingly similar cases. Since the main tool in 
Russia’s foreign policy arsenal seems to be using energy as leverage, I chose energy 
interactions as the operational aspect of this study. 
 Two distinct strategies were identified in the near abroad. One is a strategy of 
moderation, at work in Ukraine. The other is a strategy of conflict, at work in Georgia. 
The impacts of varying strategies are not subtle. In the case of Georgia, an aggressive 
strategy created a reactionary aggression in Georgia. This led Tbilisi to resist Russian 
influence and alter their energy arrangements so as to remove Russia’s main lever of 
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control. Russia still wanted to exert influence in Georgia, but was forced to resort to other 
measures, such as economic sanctions and eventual military force. 
 In Ukraine, Russia continues to employ a strategy of moderation and consolation. 
Instead of aggressive cutoffs and demanding Ukraine pay their debt, Russia offers 
Ukraine lower prices, forgives debt at key times, and tries to garner influence within 
Ukrainian industries and government. Russia continues to succeed on this front, keeping 
Ukrainian politicians divided and unable to assert their independence from Russia. 
 The differences in strategy raise another important question: Why has Russia 
applied different strategies to its seemingly similar neighbors? The answer relates to 
linkages and leverage, but in a different manner than scholars have previously presented 
it. Georgia lacked any linkages with the West or leverage over Russia, which 
consequently dictated the Kremlin’s truculent approach. Ukraine, on the other hand, has 
many linkages with the West and in turn considerable leverage over Russia, leading to 
Russia’s cautious approach. 
 Further work is required; there must be more examinations of variation in 
Russia’s near abroad, with careful study of other operational aspects. Other countries 
lying in this ambiguous category of former Soviet states, such as Kyrgyzstan and 
Moldova, should be closely examined to further refine theory on variations in Russia’s 
near abroad. 
 This work suggests that power relations in the Russian near abroad and countries 
reliance on Russia are not likely to change any time soon. Countries with linkages and 
leverage over Russia, such as Ukraine, have failed to leave Russia’s bosom even when 
they try, suggesting that Central Asian countries that may follow suit will probably face 
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similar difficulty. Perhaps the most important factor is Russia’s need to maintain 
influence at all costs in the region. The Kremlin continues to reject all attempts to cede 
authority in the region to other bodies. The Russian mindset towards the near abroad is an 
old one, and probably will not shift, no matter how liberal Russia’s president may be in 
the future. 
 
 
